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     Abstract 
In this paper, which was prepared to help set the stage at an interdisciplinary 
conference held at the University of Indiana (Bloomington) in March, I first briefly 
review what I take to be the key events and developments in the history of the study of 
judicial behavior in legal scholarship, with attention to corresponding developments in 
political science. I identify obstacles to cooperation in the past – such as indifference, 
professional self-interest and methodological imperialism -- as well as precedents for 
cross-fertilization in the future. Second, drawing on extensive reading in the political 
science and legal literatures concerning judicial behavior, I seek to identify the most 
important lessons that we have learned, or should have learned, to date, as the 
springboard for progress in the future. The first lesson is that the relationship between 
law and judicial politics (as I define them) is not monolithic; it varies among courts and, 
even on the same court, among cases. As a result, we should speak of “judicial 
behaviors” rather than “judicial behavior.” The second lesson is that there is no 
dichotomy between law and judicial politics; they are complements, each needing (or 
relying on) the other. The third lesson is that the mix of law and judicial politics on any 
given court does or should result from institutional design decisions that reflect what the 
polity wants from that court. Finally, I argue that, because the relevance of the enterprise 
in which we are engaged and its stakes transcend the world of scholarship, scholars who 
work in this area bear a special burden of responsibility.  
 
I. Introduction 
It is fitting that I have been asked to help set the stage for this conference by 
appearing with Professor Segal on a panel that compares legal and political science 
models of judicial behavior and the light they shed on what judges do. I am not only a 
law professor; I am an old law professor. Moreover, a legal scholar commenting on an 
article that I published in 1997 called it the work of a “committed formalist,” which was 
not intended as a compliment (Neuborne 1997, 2094). Who better to channel William 
Blackstone than an aged “committed formalist?” 
 
What had I done to deserve the pejorative?  In a festschrift honoring Jack 
Weinstein, I had argued that, although Professor Weinstein’s brilliance and creativity 
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accompanied him from Columbia Law School to the bench, so also did his conception of 
professional autonomy and his ideology. A federal trial judge, I argued, does not have, 
and cannot properly assert, the intellectual independence of a member of the United 
States Supreme Court, let alone of a tenured law professor. I also argued that ideology in 
the sense of a set of policy preferences that holds sway “with such power as to be 
impervious to adjudicative facts, competing policies, or the governing law as generally 
understood” is “revealed as the enemy of judicial independence” (1997, 1999).1  
 
If those views mark me as a “committed formalist,” so be it. In fact, I agree with 
Professor Schauer that “[f]ormalism is about power” (1988, 543), and that it “ought to be 
seen as a tool to be used in some parts of the legal system and not in others” (1988, 547). 
Sensible commitment to rules and the values of predictability, even-handed treatment and 
stability that such commitment can advance is an important feature – by no means, 
however, the only important feature -- of a well-functioning legal system. It is for that 
reason an important part of what it means, or should mean, to be a judge on some courts, 
in some types of cases, at some times. I have even ventured the view that “all members of 
the [Supreme] Court, including its strong ideologues, are imbued to some extent with 
Rule of Law values, and that almost all of them understand the importance of adherence 
to, or rational explanations for departures from, precedent” (2007, 141; see also Gerhardt 
2008). 
 
As this truncated statement of views suggests, I do not champion the monolithic 
and mechanistic account of judicial behavior that Professor Segal and his co-author, 
Harold Spaeth, represent as “the legal model” (2002).2 Thus, in writing about Judge 
Weinstein, I acknowledged that “[j]udges are bound to have beliefs about both the 
appropriate role of, and appropriate policies or goals for, government, some of which 
they are bound to translate into law” (1997, 1999).3  To provide richer context for the 
views about law and politics that I express here, it may be useful at the start briefly to 
elaborate my scholarly background and orientation. Since I have not deeply engaged the 
political science literature on judicial behavior until recently, this can serve as evidence 
of my “Bayesian priors” (Posner 2008, 67) on the questions before us at this conference. 
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It would be hard to find any lawyer, law professor, or judge who did not believe 
that on some questions governed by law – whether deadlines in procedure or default rules 
in contract -- the existence of a clear and determinate rule is more important than the 
content of that rule. In addition, some legal doctrine such as preclusion (res judicata) 
(Burbank 1986), although hardly devoid of policy, is so complicated that lawyers and 
judges need all the help they can get.4  Even though, wearing his scholar’s hat, Richard 
Posner proclaimed the “epistemic shallowness” of doctrinal scholarship (1995, 88), as a 
judge he has come to bemoan its threatened disappearance from the legal academy (2008, 
209-10). In any event, while mastering highly technical procedural doctrine, I learned 
through close attention to history that the struggle for federal procedural reform in the 
early twentieth century was a struggle for power (1982a), and I came to realize that, in 
the practical world of procedural lawmaking, empiricism is perhaps the best way to test 
claims of objectivity or neutrality, as well as to identify problems of lawmaking 
legitimacy (1989). More generally, I came to understand that, although the capacity for 
technical reasoning is a necessary condition for good scholarship in procedure, it is not a 
sufficient condition (2002a).5 
 
My early work in procedure resulted in recruitment to write the procedural rules 
for the Third Circuit implementing the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct 
and Disability Act of 1980 (1982b). That work, in turn, led to service on the National 
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal. With Judge (former law school 
professor and dean) Jay Plager, I was able to shape the Commission’s research program 
so that its recommendations could be informed by studies using multiple research 
strategies, including multiple qualitative and quantitative empirical methods (Burbank & 
Plager 1993).  
 
Service on the Commission, together with work for the American Judicature 
Society (AJS), caused me to explore questions of judicial independence and 
accountability in depth, work that included my first systematic exposure to political 
science scholarship (1999). That experience, nurtured by conversations with my friend, 
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Barry Friedman, who was also actively involved in the work of AJS, resulted in our joint 
perception that law professors and political scientists had been talking past one another 
about judicial independence. As a result we organized an interdisciplinary conference 
attended by some thirty scholars spanning four disciplines, an enterprise that yielded an 
edited volume advocating, and suggesting the promise of, an interdisciplinary approach 
(Burbank & Friedman 2002a).  
 
Returning to work in procedure, I realized that, as a scholar whose main message 
had been the power of procedure, I should be conversant with, and deploy the insights of, 
the discipline that systematically studies power in government. Thus, in recent years I 
have sought to enrich my procedural work with the fruits of research in political science, 
all the while holding to the view that the best scholarship is that which can leverage the 
perspectives and techniques of as many relevant disciplines as possible (2004a).  
 
In sum, I am an old law professor who aspires not to be old-fashioned. I have 
done a great deal of analytical and normative scholarship, a great deal of work exploring 
doctrinal and institutional history, and some work deploying quantitative and qualitative 
data, including data that I have generated for the projects  (1989; 2004b). The quantitative 
work that I have done is primitive, and I am not competent to assess many questions of 
statistical method. I have had occasion, however, to pay close attention to questions 
concerning inferences that can properly be drawn from quantitative data (2004c).   
 
In seeking to help set the stage for this conference, I first briefly review what I 
take to be the key events and developments in the history of the study of judicial behavior 
in legal scholarship, with attention to corresponding developments in political science. I  
identify obstacles to cooperation in the past – such as indifference, professional self-
interest and methodological imperialism -- as well as precedents for cross-fertilization in 
the future.  
 
Second, drawing on extensive reading in the political science and legal literatures 
concerning judicial behavior and the wonderful experience of teaching a seminar on the 
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subject with my colleague, Ted Ruger, that regularly brought in scholars working in the 
area to discuss their work-in-progress, I seek to identify the most important lessons that 
we have learned, or should have learned, to date, as the springboard for progress in the 
future. The first lesson is that the relationship between law and judicial politics (as I 
define them) is not monolithic; it varies among courts and, even on the same court, 
among cases. As a result, we should speak of “judicial behaviors” rather than “judicial 
behavior.” The second lesson is that there is no dichotomy between law and judicial 
politics; they are complements, each needing (or relying on) the other. The third lesson is 
that the mix of law and judicial politics on any given court does or should result from 
institutional design decisions that reflect what the polity wants from that court. 
  
Finally, I argue that, because the relevance of the enterprise in which we are 
engaged and its stakes transcend the world of scholarship, scholars who work in this area 
bear a special burden of responsibility.  
 
II. A Troubled History 
 
When I was a student at the Harvard Law School in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s, one might not have known that political scientists at the University studied the 
courts (or more precisely the Supreme Court). I knew it, because as a Harvard 
undergraduate, I had been privileged to take Government 154 from Robert McCloskey, 
vignettes from whose brilliant lectures about the Court and its history have remained with 
me over forty years. I recall for instance his lecture on the formative influences on a 
Supreme Court Justice, the exemplar being that “old, bald-headed son of a bitch,” 
Stephen Field (Aitken & Aitken 2008, 156). Nor can I think of Morrison Waite -- not that 
I think very often about Morrison Waite -- without hearing McCloskey describe his 
opinions as “turgid and incomprehensible.”  Someone, perhaps Paul Freund, told me that 
McCloskey was the exception to the rule that Harvard Law School did not welcome 
political scientists. Whether or not that was true, precious few of McCloskey’s insights, 
or of those of other political scientists, made it into the courses I took or the course 
materials I studied.   
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My courses with Paul Freund did benefit from the influence that Thomas Reed 
Powell, his teacher and later colleague, had on that great constitutional scholar. But 
Powell was both a lawyer and a political scientist. His influence on Freund was that of a 
legal realist with acute analytical skills who paid close attention to judicial decisions, 
believed that ideas matter, and was on record that “[t]hose who see law as judicial whim 
or fiat are partly right, but only partly. Those who see law as only this or only that see but 
narrowly” (Freund 1956, 800). 
 
In retrospect, the indifference to political science in that era is not a surprise, 
because Harvard Law School was still in the grip of the legal process approach (Kalman 
1986). This was an effort to navigate between two strands of legal realism: its 
de(con)structive project of exposing the indeterminacy of law that (as some legal realists 
would have it) permits judges to pursue their own values while hiding behind the myth 
that the law made them do it, and its constructive project of seeking to develop policy 
through a value-neutral assembly and analysis of empirical data (facts).6  The latter 
(constructive) strand fell out of favor quickly, as law professors became discouraged by 
the time and money required to gather data, and by the seemingly slight payoffs, and with 
the effects of the Depression on funding (Kalman 1986). The former (de(con)structive) 
strand, always living uneasily in Langdell Hall,7 came increasingly under pressure with 
attacks on the Warren Court in the 1950’s and the quest for neutral principles such 
attacks elicited (Wechsler 1959).8 Long before that, however, both strands of legal 
realism had been caught up in controversy about scientific naturalism during what 
Edward Purcell describes as “the crisis of democratic theory” that was caused by the rise 
of totalitarian governments on the left and the right in the 1920’s and 1930’s.  
   
As with their colleagues in philosophy and the social sciences, 
 however, the realists’ motives could not explain away the 
 intellectual problems they generated. Intentionally or not, 
 their theoretical position raised two basic questions about 
 traditional democratic theory. First, how could the idea of the 
 subjectivity of judicial decision be squared with the doctrine that 
 free men should be subject only to known and established law, 
 one of the hallmarks of republican as opposed to despotic 
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 government? Second, if the acts of government officials were 
 the only real law, on what basis could anyone evaluate 
 or criticize those acts?  What, in other words, was the 
 moral basis of the legal system in particular and of  
 democratic government in general? Most revealingly, 
 Felix Cohen, who alone among the realists attempted an  
 elaborate analysis of ethical theory, admitted that his  
 conclusions remained “in the shadow” of doubt and  
 bordered on failure. That was an unsatisfactory solution 
 to almost everyone after the middle thirties (1973, 94). 
 
I have taught at law schools in one capacity or another since 1976. For many 
years thereafter, the study of judicial behavior in legal scholarship essentially did not 
exist. Even after technology facilitated, and funds became available for, empirical 
research, reducing obstacles that had discouraged legal realists in the 1930’s, such 
research was not valued at most elite law schools.9 Rather, law professors advanced 
conceptions of judicial behavior, and for a decade or more the most prominent such 
conceptions were advanced by scholars of polar opposite policy preferences and, usually, 
political persuasions.  
 
On one side there were the adherents of Critical Legal Studies, latter day realists 
with an attitude, if not a social agenda, who tended to confuse the question of what judges 
can do with the question of what they ought to do and who, in any event, did not 
systematically explore what judges in fact do.10 On the other side there were the 
adherents of Law and Economics, whose agenda was to explain law through micro-
economic theory and, to the extent they were concerned about judicial behavior, to 
explain it through an economic theory of human behavior (Posner 1995). Richer than the 
conception of judicial behavior held by most adherents of Critical Legal Studies, for 
many years this too was, nevertheless, a theory undisciplined by facts.  
 
Finally, in that area of legal scholarship most likely to overlap with, and be 
informed by, political science – constitutional law – judges “behaved” either in a world 
of doctrine or in a world of theory. In neither sphere, with few exceptions, was the 
scholarship of law professors informed by quantitative analysis or by the insights of 
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traditional political science, perhaps because the legal scholars in question “were more 
interested in shaping the law than explaining it” (Keck 2007, 511; see also Friedman 
2006, 263). 
 
Most of this is, I suspect, old news even to political scientists. Certainly, in the 
period chronicled here – that is, until quite recently -- members of that discipline had 
good reason for the complaint that law professors ignored their work. To their great 
credit, the same was not true in the other direction. Legal realism is acknowledged as one 
of the intellectual inspirations of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior (Segal & 
Spaeth 2002). In addition, although rational choice (strategic) theory was evident in the 
law and courts subfield as early as the 1950’s, political scientists have generously 
credited law professors, economists and business school professors with reviving it by 
demonstrating its potential (Epstein and Knight 2003; Brenner 2003). 
 
Admirable as the willingness of political scientists to follow a scholarly Golden 
Rule has been, it renders more puzzling the certitude that some of them have occasionally 
displayed in their dismissive treatment of the notion that law may play a role in the 
behavior of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court (Segal & Spaeth 2002; see 
Keck 2008).11 For one who is conversant with the intellectual (and moral) dilemmas that 
scientific naturalism was thought to pose in the 1930’s, Thomas Reed Powell’s 
observation about those who “see but narrowly” is wise counsel in favor of humility. One 
would have thought the same of the cautions expressed by C. Herman Pritchett, “the first 
pioneer in what became the leading body of research on judicial behavior” (Baum 2003, 
71). Pritchett observed that “political scientists, who have done so much to put the 
‘political’ in ‘political jurisprudence’ need to emphasize that it is still ‘jurisprudence.’ It 
is judging in a political context, but it is still judging; and judging is still different from 
legislating or administering. … Any accurate analysis of judicial behavior must have as a 
major purpose a full clarification of the unique limiting conditions under which judicial 
policy making proceeds” (1969, 42).12  
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It is tempting for a law professor to regard political scientists’ dismissals of law 
from the landscape of judicial behavior as payback for decades of neglect by better paid, 
higher status colleagues across campus. Yet, law professors have not been the only, and 
probably not the primary, targets of criticism by those who deny the influence of law. 
After all, Pritchett’s caution was a response to what Lawrence Baum has termed “a 
degree of intolerance across methodological divides [within political science], especially 
directed by quantitative scholars toward those who do qualitative research” (2003, 69).13 
Consider in that regard Epstein and Knight’s answer to the question “why scholars so 
fully embraced the social-psychological [attitudinal] paradigm and so fully spurned the 
sort of strategic analysis [political scientist Walter] Murphy conducted in [The]Elements 
[of Judicial Strategy]” (2003, 208): 
 
During the 1960s, as Murphy made clear to us, the great 
 battles in the field of judicial politics were not between 
 proponents of the rational choice and social-psychological 
 models but between traditionalists and behavioralists; 
 between those who believed that social scientists should 
 develop realistic and generalizable explanations of social 
 behavior and those who did not; and, increasingly, between 
 those who believed that scholars could quantify behavior and 
 those who did not share such beliefs … To be 
 a scientist in the world of judicial politics by the 1970s was 
 to value data and to believe in the power of statistics. It is 
 thus hardly surprising that scholars working in the social- 
 psychological tradition triumphed over their strategically 
 minded counterparts. Beginning with Pritchett’s The Roosevelt 
 Court (1948) and culminating with Segal and Spaeth’s  
 The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (1993), such  
 scholars have claimed to gather a tremendous amount of systematic 
 support for their theory. Unlike Murphy, they typically refrained 
 from detailed analyses of particular litigation (the modus 
 operandi of the traditionalists) and instead focused on large 
 samples of Court cases, claiming to predict their dispositions 
 with a good deal of success (2003, 210).14 
 
Indeed, perhaps the real intended audience for criticisms of “outdated immersion in legal 
rules and legal doctrine” were “mainstream” political scientists, since, “[b]y 
demonstrating that the study of judicial behavior was amenable to statistical analyses, 
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[quantitative law and courts scholars] could thereby prove [their] bona fides as card-
carrying social scientists” (Scheingold 2008, 748).15  
 
III. The Present Situation 
  
That was then. This is now. Now is better. Even if still viewed with suspicion at 
some law schools – and hence, a risky scholarly path for the untenured -- empirical 
research on legal institutions, including courts,16 seems poised to fulfill the promise that 
eluded the legal realists, albeit without the pretense of value-agnostic pragmatism that 
Robert Hutchins unmasked.17   More to the point of this conference, for close to two 
decades scholars teaching at law (and business) schools have been making important 
contributions to the literature on judicial behavior, particularly (as discussed above) by 
developing and testing rational choice models of judicial behavior (Eskridge 1991; 
Revesz 1997; Cross & Tiller 1998; Friedman & Harvey 2006; Cross 2007; Posner 2008; 
Landes & Posner 2008; Kim 2009). Others, whether or not themselves conducting 
original empirical research, have begun regularly to consult the political science literature 
on courts and judicial behavior, and, unencumbered by turf wars, to find nourishment  
“across methodological divides” (Friedman 2006).   
 
An overwhelming majority of judges are probably ignorant of the political science 
literature on judicial behavior. Some judges read law reviews, however, and because 
those teaching in law schools tend to publish in law reviews, some of their articles on 
judicial behavior came to the attention of judges and elicited responses (Edwards 1998; 
Wald 1999). Although at times reminiscent of methodological intolerance in political 
science, more recently these interventions have suggested a dialogue holding the 
possibility for all participants to learn (Edwards 2003).    
 
The same, I hope and would like to believe, is true of the relationship between 
law professors and quantitatively oriented political scientists.18  Although some political 
scientists abandoned “the scholarly Golden Rule” in the throes of a disciplinary turf war, 
they have regained (or can regain) the high road and, in any event, clearly are more 
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willing to engage -- to participate in a dialogue with -- law professors who are interested 
in the study of judicial behavior. Witness their presence at this conference. There are 
doubtless many reasons for these welcome developments (or prospects).  I will suggest 
three.  
 
First, it cannot hurt that, after decades of neglect which, after a while, must have 
seemed malignant rather than benign, law professors and law schools are paying attention 
to the work of judicial behavior scholars in political science.  The attention paid comes in 
many forms: citations in the legal literature, invitations to present work in seminars for 
law school faculty and/or students, invitations to co-author with law faculty, increasing 
opportunities to publish in law reviews,19 and, perhaps most important for the inter-
disciplinary enterprise, appointments to law school faculties. “Ignorance [and] self-
interest” may still prompt “skepticism of the empirical literature on judicial ideology” 
(Fischman & Law 2008, 3) among some law professors, but their ranks are thinning.   
 
Second, it is hard to ignore the energy, creativity and research results of those 
scholars, including law professors, who have taken up the challenge by quantitative 
political scientists to demonstrate by acceptable (that is, of course, quantitative) methods 
that law matters, including on the Supreme Court, and how it matters (Richards & Kritzer 
2002; Kritzer & Richards 2003, 2005; Kastellec & Lax 2008; Cross 2007; Johnson, 
Spriggs & Wahlbeck 2007; Bailey & Maltzman 2008). To the extent that such efforts are 
deemed successful, the narrowly instrumental theory that the Justices (or judges more 
generally) are autonomous, uni-focal and uni-dimensional personal-policy-preference 
machines20 that underlies the attitudinal model and, without the assumption of complete 
autonomy, the work of some rational choice scholars,21 has lost any claim to monopoly 
power.  “Justices are not simply life-tenured policy maximizers” (Bailey & Maltzman 
2008, 282). 
 
Third, at the same time that some scholars have sought to meet the challenge to 
model law, other scholars have begun to take a close look at the “science” undergirding 
the work of those issuing the challenge. The number and variety of fundamental 
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assumptions, operating principles, and concrete choices that have been questioned, 
particularly within the last few years, are impressive (Kritzer 1996; Gillman 2001; 
Friedman 2006; Shapiro 2009; Fischman & Law 2008; Landes & Posner 2008; Kim 
2009; Kastellec & Lax 2008; Braman 2008). Many of the demonstrated problems can be 
fixed. Yet, now that there is good reason, on their own terms, to question quantitative 
political scientists’ monopoly of knowledge about the wellsprings of judicial behavior,22 
other problems in the specification and testing of their models and with their data --  such 
as behavioral or observational equivalence (or collinear variables) (Segal 1984; Friedman 
2006; Stras 2006; Bailey & Maltzman 2008; Fischman & Law 2008),23 inability to 
accommodate cases presenting multiple issues (Young 2002; Braman 2008; Shapiro 
2009), selection bias (Kastellec & Lax 2008), coding bias (Harvey 2008; Fischman & 
Law 2008) and systematic coding errors (Stras 2006; Landes & Posner 2008, Shapiro 
2009)24 -- may prompt greater humility, perhaps helping to bridge the methodological 
divide.25  
 
What, then, do I see as the state of current knowledge about judicial behavior?  
The framework I have chosen to describe it is drawn from my work on judicial 
independence and accountability, particularly the interdisciplinary work with Barry 
Friedman to which I have referred (1999; Burbank & Friedman 2002a; Burbank & 
Friedman 2002b). Accountability to law is an important source of constraint (or self-
restraint, Ferejohn & Kramer 2006) posited by those who resist claims that judges are 
completely independent to decide as they wish. A putative dichotomy between 
independence and accountability thus maps well on to a putative dichotomy between 
“judicial politics,” defined for this purpose as the pursuit of a judge’s preferences on 
matters of policy relevant in litigation, and “law,” defined for this purpose as known 
and established (but not necessarily determinate) law. This way of framing the inquiry 
recalls one of the realists’ dilemmas described by Purcell (1973). It also recalls the turf 
war in the law and courts subfield of political science. Imagine my surprise when, having 
learned from one group of political scientists that Supreme Court Justices are accountable 
to elected politicians (Dahl 1957; McCloskey 2005) and thus that judicial independence 
is a myth (Rosenberg 1991; Jacob 1962), I learned from another group of political 
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scientists that Supreme Court Justices are wholly independent, and thus that judicial 
accountability is a myth (Segal & Spaeth 2002).  
 
A. For Contextualism 
 
The first lesson that I take from a review of the judicial behavior literatures is that, 
just as it is an error to treat judicial independence (and accountability) as a monolith 
(Burbank & Friedman 2002b), so, in describing judicial behavior, it is an error to assert 
or assume that the relationship between “judicial politics” and “law” is or should be the 
same with respect to every judge in a particular judicial system, or indeed that it is or 
should be the same even for judges on the same court in every type of case.26 In sum, we 
should speak not of “judicial behavior” but of “judicial behaviors” (Friedman, 2006). 
 
For many years these points were obscured as a result of the long-time virtual 
monopoly that studies of the United States Supreme Court held in the public law subfield 
of political science. 
 
By the 1950s “public law” political science had pretty much  
 reduced itself to the study of the constitutional law decisions 
 of the U.S. Supreme Court. So when the behavioral revolution 
 started to revolt against the “public law” subfield of political 
 science, it revolted against what was there, namely, the study of  
 the Supreme Court’s constitutional law opinions, by proclaiming 
 that what ought to be studied was not the formal prescriptions  
 of the justices’ written opinions but the real political behavior 
 of the justices; that is, their votes in the constitutional cases. 
 The rather grandiose title was “judicial behavior.” The real  
 study was the voting behavior of nine of the thousands of judges  
 in the U.S. and even then only their votes in a small subset of  
 cases they actually voted on (Shapiro 2008, 769). 
 
 
Even today the variousness of the relationship between “law” and “judicial politics” may 
be obscured by the occasional failure of scholars to confine descriptions of their results, 
and their claims, to the judges, courts and cases in fact studied and/or their apparent 
reluctance to acknowledge that judges on different courts are influenced in different ways 
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and to different degrees, including by “law,” even after that should have been clear (Segal 
& Spaeth 2002, 10, 92-93, 235; Spaeth 2008, 753).27   
 
Those promoting the attitudinal model have never satisfactorily explained 
unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court, which in recent years have accounted for 
thirty to forty percent of the Court’s output. And these percentages are “misleading” 
because they “ignore the petitions for certiorari that the Justices turn down because they 
are not minded to disturb a precedent for which they would not have voted in the first 
place, and the petitions that are never filed because the Court would be sure to deny them 
on the basis of established precedent or clear constitutional or statutory language” 
(Posner 2008, 50; see also Gerhardt 2008).28 Even if an explanation for unanimous 
decisions other than a shared view of what fidelity to law requires were plausible, such an 
explanation presumably would contemplate behavior different from that evinced in 5-4 
decisions.   Moreover, even if one were willing to accept the test of adherence to 
precedent used by Segal and Spaeth in their attempt quantitatively to falsify the operation 
of the legal model on the Supreme Court (2002), that would tell us nothing about the role 
of precedent on the lower federal (or state) courts. In fact, as many scholars have pointed 
out, their test confuses judicial roles, neglecting the fact that the legal norms concerning 
precedent that govern Supreme Court Justices are different from those that govern the 
judges of other courts (Gillman 2001; Gerhardt 2003; Friedman 2006).29 Moreover, 
recently other scholars have provided “evidence that non-policy factors [including 
precedent] influence Supreme Court justices and that the extent of such influence varies 
across individual justices in interesting ways” (Bailey & Maltzman 2008, 369). 
 
The attitudinal model requires that the Justices not be constrained by Congress (or 
by the Executive Branch), which is the most obvious reason why its proponents have 
resisted contrary findings by those testing rational choice models designed to determine 
whether the Justices act strategically in anticipation of responses by Congress (Segal & 
Spaeth 2002, 106-09, 346). In unpublished work perhaps stimulated by Harvey and 
Friedman’s study that yielded “fairly robust support, across different models of the 
legislative process, for the hypothesis of a constitutionally constrained Court” (2006, 
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553), Professor Segal proves (again) that his commitment to scholarship is stronger than 
his commitment to the attitudinal model (Segal, Westerland & Lindquist 2007). He 
reports statistical results leading him to conclude that, although the Court does not act 
strategically in its statutory rulings, there is an “institutional maintenance effect” 
discernable in its constitutional decisions, one that is attributable to concern not about the 
fate of a particular decision but about the Court’s ongoing ability to function 
independently (recalling the distinction in the political science literature on legitimacy 
between specific support and diffuse support) (Caldeira & Gibson 1992).    
 
A less obvious reason why adherents of the attitudinal model may feel invested in 
falsifying strategic accounts relates to a defense they have deployed in response to their 
critics. There is something deeply unsettling about an account of judicial behavior, even 
if confined to the Justices of the Supreme Court, that consigns, if not all of the effort of 
the lawyers briefing and arguing cases before them, then the opinions that fill the U.S. 
Reports, to the category of window-dressing.30 The attitudinalists’ response to criticisms 
reflecting that discomfort has been the assurance that they are not claiming conscious 
dissembling, coupled with invocation of the phenomenon of motivated reasoning, about 
which, however, they profess agnosticism (Segal & Spaeth 2002, 433).31 If, however, the 
Justices are acting strategically, modifying their behavior in anticipation of, or response 
to, other actors, it is not clear that there is any room for motivated reasoning. That helps 
to explain why some strategic accounts, as for instance of stare decisis on the Supreme 
Court, are so controversial in certain quarters (Bloom 2001; Edwards 2003).  
 
Increasingly over the past thirty years, political scientists and law professors have 
studied judicial behavior on courts other than the United States Supreme Court. The 
necessary conditions for the operation of the attitudinal model do not exist on those 
courts, but the failure satisfactorily to deal with unanimous opinions has also been a 
problem in many of the studies of their judges (Piniello 1999). More recently, by 
exposing the influence of precedent and of law more generally on lower court judges, 
scholars have confirmed that judicial behavior is not monolithic (Cross 2007; Sisk & 
Heise 2005). It has not been clear, however, whether findings of widespread obedience to 
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Supreme Court precedent on the courts of appeals – findings acknowledged by Segal and 
Spaeth (2002, 96) --- reflect the influence of law or simply strategic behavior to avoid 
reversal. The latter explanation became increasingly implausible as the Supreme Court’s 
appetite for work became more anorexic. Moreover, as noted by Professor Cross, “the 
studies to date have shown only very limited evidence of hierarchical strategic decision 
making by circuit courts” (2007, 103). He continued: 
   
The possibility of legal model decision making somewhat  
 complicates any test of the strategic model. Even if the 
 Supreme Court justices themselves decide cases ideologically, 
 those decisions then become the law that subsequent circuit 
 court decisions are supposed to follow … Most of the previous 
 studies on strategic decision making have not segregated the  
 theories because the researchers did not consider the possible  
 separate effects of legal model precedent on decision making  
 (2007, 103-04). 
 
Using a “proxy for following the precedents of previous Supreme Courts,” Cross 
obtained results that are “striking and directly opposite of what the strategic theories of 
compliance with the Supreme Court would suggest,” leading him to conclude that 
“circuit court judges do not anticipatorily repudiate old precedents but instead 
aggressively follow old precedents that are presumptively unattractive to the current 
Supreme Court” (2007, 104-05).  
 
 Forthcoming work by Professor Kim confirms the existence of panel effects – 
different voting behavior by court of appeals judges on ideologically heterogeneous than 
on ideologically homogeneous panels – in sex discrimination cases (2009).  She too finds 
no evidence that such behavior (on the part of those in the ideological majority) reflects a 
strategic response to possible reversal by the Supreme Court, and for that and other 
reasons she rejects the “whistleblowing” hypothesis posited by Cross and Tiller (1998). 
She does find, however, that such behavior is correlated with the proximity of the 
minority panel member’s preferences to those of the circuit median judge, which is 
consistent with strategic behavior to avoid reversal by the en banc court of appeals.  
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To her credit, noting statistics indicating that en banc review is about as (un)likely 
as review by the Supreme Court, Professor Kim discusses possible alternative 
explanations for her findings, in particular deliberative accounts that focus on the internal 
dynamics of a panel. One such account is the “intuitive–override theory” (Guthrie, 
Rachlinski & Wistrich 2007) according to which the “intuitive judgments of court of 
appeals judges might entail quick decisions that tend to align with their policy 
preferences – judgments that may yield if subjected to more deliberative processes. The 
presence of a judge with a different ideological orientation might induce such a 
deliberative process on the part of the majority judges” (2009,      ).  
 
Professor Kim’s distinction between “the internal dynamics of panel deliberation” 
and “interaction with other actors in the judicial system” is potentially misleading. That 
courts of appeals accomplish (almost all of their) decisional work through panels of three 
judges should not cause us to forget that the court as a whole bears responsibility for the 
law of the circuit. That the judges take their responsibility very seriously is suggested by 
rules forbidding one panel from overruling the legal ruling of another and by pre- and 
post-release opinion dissemination practices that permit all judges to see what their 
colleagues are doing (or proposing to do) without having to rely on disappointed litigants.  
 
These features of circuit practice probably mean that, pace Professor Kim, the 
shadow of en banc review is longer than that of Supreme Court review. But they also 
raise the question whether we should conceive of the deliberations or dialogue occurring 
when panel members have different views as restricted to the panel. Conversely, of 
course, strategic behavior need not be confined to maximizing a judge’s preferences as to 
policy. As often pointed out, rational choice models can accommodate a preference for 
law (Epstein & Knight 2003; Posner 2008).  
 
Professor Kim’s admirable acknowledgment of the problem of behavioral or 
observational equivalence causes her to be appropriately cautious in reporting her 
findings and in making claims. My point here is only that consideration of her posited 
deliberative/strategic dichotomy underscores the extent to which both the attitudinal 
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model and rational choice models based solely on a preference for policy deny any 
consequential role on a plural court for dialogue about law (Edwards 2003; Whittington 
2000). Particularly if motivated reasoning is not an available refuge, but in any event, one 
can only wonder why judges, including the Justices, spend so much time talking, and 
talking about, law, not just publicly (as at oral argument or in opinions), but to each 
other.32 In believing that such dialogue can make a difference, at least some of the time, I 
feel less old-fashioned having read the report of a recent study finding that, controlling 
for ideology, the “Justices’ votes in a case depend substantially on the relative quality of 
the lawyers appearing before the Court” (Johnson, Spriggs & Wahlbeck 2007, 524). 
 
All of this suggests that just because parsimony is useful in modeling for purposes 
of statistical analysis does not mean that the results of those analyses are sufficient for 
thinking about human behavior, about law, or for that matter about politics.  
 
Human beings are indeed charming and perverse and  
  altogether fascinating creatures, and the study of ourselves 
  is among the richest of intellectual endeavors. We ought 
  to give ourselves more credit than the revolutionists of 
  the social sciences extend to us: we pursue many goals 
  at the same time, and we do so in all kinds of predictable 
  and unpredictable ways (Wolfe 2008, 55). 
 
Unlike the attitudinal model, a strategic model that is narrowly focused on pursuit of 
personal policy preferences at least acknowledges that judicial behavior deemed political 
because not constrained by “law” is not fundamentally different from the political 
behavior of other government actors in at least one respect: it is shaped or constrained by 
institutional context.33 Neither model, however, leaves room for other influences -- such 
as, for instance, insecurity (Burbank 2007a) -- that might complicate the judicial utility 
function with elements that do not lead invariably to pursuit of a judge’s personal policy 
preferences. Yet, whatever the merits of the psychological theories that informed the 
attitudinal model of judicial behavior (Segal & Spaeth 2002; Segal 2003), scholarship in 
the intervening decades has provided accounts of human behavior that, in their 
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complexity, accord far better with the sense that most of us have about what motivates 
(or, more precisely, can motivate) human beings (Posner 2008).  
 
In this light, it is not surprising to learn that, even on that most political of all 
American courts, the Supreme Court of the United States, the Justices respond to a 
variety of audiences, with the result that their behavior cannot be explained in a single  
dimension (Baum 2006; see also Peretti & Rozzi, 2008), or that “observed changes in 
judges’ voting  positions on final votes result from factors other than changes in 
preferences and issue content” (Meinke & Scott 2007, 933). Other scholars, studying 
court of appeals chief judges, have found that “the judicial utility function includes non-
policy as well as policy concerns” (George & Yoon 2008, 8). Finally, studies have 
indicated that, on certain courts and in certain types of cases, personal characteristics 
such as religion (Sisk, Heise & Morriss 2004) and sex (Boyd, Epstein & Martin 2007) 
may influence judicial behavior, and that judges are subject to unconscious bias 
(Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich & Guthrie 2007). In sum, 
 
[r]inging changes on the “political” might seem to exhaust the 
possible nonlegalist factors in adjudication. It does not begin to. 
The possible other factors (call them “personal”) include 
personality traits, or temperament (and thus emotionality at  
one end of the temperament spectrum and emotional detachment 
at the other end),  which are more or less innate personal  
  characteristics. They include personal background characteristics, 
  such as race and sex, and also personal and professional experience. 
  … Also figuring in judicial decisions are strategic considerations … 
  Institutional factors – such as how clear or unclear the law is, 
  salary and workload, and the structure of judicial promotion – also  
  influence judicial behavior” (Posner 2008, 10). 
 
We can all agree that “social scientists should develop realistic and generalizable 
explanations of social behavior” (Epstein & Knight 2003, 210). Science has told us where 
human beings come from (Shubin 2008). It has not yet been able to tell us very much 
about the human brain (Morse 2006, 2008).34 Even when confined to the Supreme Court, 
the attitudinal model is implausible (not “realistic”) as a self-sufficient theory of judicial 
behavior, not just because it strips judging of “law” and institutional context. Both it and 
 20
narrowly instrumental strategic models are implausible because they strip judges of their 
humanity, reducing human behavior to the single-minded pursuit of a narrow set of 
goals.35  As with an external critique of criminal responsibility founded in the supposed 
implications of neuroscience that “is conceivably demonstrable by scientific findings,” 
because such models “fundamentally den[y] our ordinary understanding of ourselves,” 
they are “unlikely to undermine” that understanding until and unless such demonstration 
occurs (Morse 2006, 402). That day will never come. Recent studies contradict the 
narrow supposition of these models’ proponents, suggesting that, to the contrary, it is not 
just “law” that must be considered in the mix with “judicial politics” and that, as with 
“law,” whether and when other influences affect judicial behavior is context-dependent. 
 
B. Against Dichotomies 
 
The second lesson I take from a review of the judicial behavior literatures is that, 
just as it is an error to posit a dichotomy between judicial independence and judicial 
accountability (Burbank & Friedman 2002b), so, in describing judicial behavior, it is an 
error to posit a dichotomy between “law” and “judicial politics.” Instead, like judicial 
independence and accountability, “law” and “judicial politics” are different sides of the 
same coin. They are not opposites but rather complements. 
 
This proposition may be logically anterior to the first, and it is implicit in the way 
in which I framed some of that discussion, in particular by referring to “the relationship 
between ‘judicial politics’ … and ‘law’” and the “mix of  ‘law’ and ‘judicial politics.’” It 
is also suggested by Thomas Reed Powell’s caution that “[t]hose who see law as only this 
or only that see but narrowly” (Freund 1956, 800). I chose this order instead, because the 
evidence adduced above suggesting that “law” matters on all courts at least some of the 
time should make it clear that a “law”/”judicial politics” dichotomy is untenable with 
respect to those courts and may make it easier to rethink the relationship between them 
more generally. On the view I take here, the answer to the question at the center of this 
conference -- What’s law got to do with it? -- depends in important measure on how one 
defines law.36   
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Those who deny judicial independence have tended to think in absolute terms 
(i.e., independence or accountability, not independence and accountability), to neglect 
the role that dialogic processes play in a system of separated but interdependent 
lawmakers, and to confuse influence with control (Burbank 1999). Those who deny that 
“law” matters (judicial accountability) have tended to model and code in absolute, uni-
dimensional terms, to deny (because, for some, their theory demands it) the influence of 
dialogic processes, and to confuse the results of statistical tests confirming the influence 
of one variable in an impoverished model with proof of their prophecy.  
 
My proposition is not, however, just that different models of judicial behavior 
should be regarded as complements because “each model accurately captures some of 
what every judge does some of the time, and … no single model is likely to describe any 
judge all of the time” (Robbennolt, MacCoun, and Darley 2008, 1-2).  Judge Posner has 
warned that “one must be careful about dividing judicial decisions (or judges) into 
legalist and political, or, what is closely related, asserting a Manichean dualism between 
law and politics. The dualism only works when ‘law’ is equated to legalism, and that is 
too narrow” (2008, 8; see also 47). Or again, 
 
[t]he middle ground is not the idea that adjudication is part “law” 
 and part “ideology.” When the authors of a study of political 
 voting by federal appellate judges, finding areas of law in which 
 the judges’ presumed political leanings do not seem to influence 
 their votes, conclude that “perhaps in those areas the law is  
 effectively controlling,” they are defining “law” too narrowly. 
Law is suffused with ideology (2008, 43). 
 
Other scholars have also observed that “law” and “judicial politics” “are not, in 
fact, mutually exclusive categories: the ‘law’ may explicitly give room for a judge’s 
‘ideology’ to operate” (Fischman & Law 2008, 6). In that regard, consideration of the 
many roles that, without apology or disguise, judicial discretion plays in “law” suggests 
both that the territory where “judicial politics” are part of (cannot usefully be 
distinguished from) “law” is substantial (Gillman 2001), and that, like decisions about 
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formalism (Schauer 1988), decisions about discretion (and hence about the proper role 
for “judicial politics” in “law”) have to do with power. 
  
Positive political theorists have been skeptical that legal norms 
in themselves motivate judges, in part because they find formalistic 
 accounts of law implausible. The law, however, need not be fully 
 determinative in order to have a binding quality. Jurisprudential 
 accounts recognize that law can be both binding on judges and 
 permit them to exercise discretion in certain contexts. The discretion 
 exists not only because legal rules will inevitably be indeterminate 
 at some point, but also because social needs demand some measure 
 of flexibility in the application of legal rules, and because institutional 
 values argue for allocating different types of power between different 
 levels of the judiciary (Kim 2007, 442).37 
 
Obscuring this relationship between (not opposition of) “law” and “judicial 
politics” were, at one time, claims made by lawyers, scholars and judges concerned to 
establish, preserve or augment their professional power by minimizing judicial agency in 
(or, as opposed to) “law” (including even, or especially, the common law), and more 
recently, anachronistic insistence on such claims by political scientists concerned to 
establish, preserve or augment disciplinary power by maximizing judicial agency in (or 
as opposed to) “law.”38 Critical to acceptance of this proposition by both groups is a 
willingness to renounce reductionist thinking (Clayton 2003, 308), even at the risk of 
losing professional power. Like a “[m]onolithic brain explanation of complex behavior,” 
a monolithic social science explanation of judicial behavior is almost always “radically 
incomplete” (Morse 2006, 464).  
 
The quotation above from Professor Kim’s valuable discussion of judicial 
discretion has both positive and normative dimensions. Confident that she, Judge Posner 
(2008), and others in law and political science (e.g., Gillman 2001) are correct as a 
descriptive matter when they insist on a more nuanced view of law that recognizes the 
“interpenetration of law and [judicial] politics” (Whittington 2000, 631), I will not pause 
long over the objection that such accounts are non-falsifiable (Segal & Spaeth 2002, 48 
n.12, 433).  
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One response to that objection is a reminder that a person whose only tool is a 
hammer is prone to see only nails. Another is to recall the reasons for humility, canvassed 
above, given how the science of modeling and statistics has fared even with models not at 
all nuanced in this respect. A more hopeful response is that the relevant science (which, 
after all, has come a long way since the realists’ forays into the empirical world) may one 
day catch up to the complexity of the enterprise, and that in the meanwhile, as recent 
work suggests, some law can be modeled and its influence tested through statistical 
manipulation. For the rest, and given that, as I discuss below, the stakes are not limited to 
the world of scholarship, I prefer the messiness of lived experience to the tidiness of 
unrealistically parsimonious models.39  
 
Like those responsible for legal processes, legislative and judicial, scholars who 
study those processes and the human beings who make them work should seek 
enlightenment from science. At the end of the day, however, just as “it may be a mistake 
to let science furnish not only evidence with which we adjudicate controversies but the 
standards for deciding whether evidence can be considered” (Burbank 1996; see also 
Lempert 2009), so too may some judicial behavior elude the scientific techniques by 
which we seek to pin down phenomena in the natural world (Edwards 2003).  
 
In thus rejecting the belief of some realists “that truth [is] wholly dependent on 
empirically established facts,” I do not side with the rational absolutists’ belief “that 
human reason [can] discover certain universal principles of justice by philosophical 
analysis of the nature of reality” (Purcell 1973, 176). I simply opt for an epistemology 
that seems appropriate in light of how little we know about the causal mechanisms of 
human behavior, mindful that 
 
[i]n the long history of humankind, the social sciences were 
 developed only recently, but we have been trying to figure 
 ourselves out since we first began to think. It defies the 
 imagination that one new methodology or theoretical assumption 
 is going to topple all previous efforts to understand the human 
 condition (Wolfe 2008, 55). 
 
 24
This is not the occasion to delve deeply into the normative dimensions of 
Professor Kim’s account of judicial discretion. Yet, some consideration of those 
dimensions is appropriate, if only as a way to anticipate questions likely to be raised by 
the proposition that “law” and “judicial politics” are complements or different sides of 
the same coin. I have already indicated that complementarity means more than existing 
side-by-side. But if it is true that “law” is “suffused with” “judicial politics” (Posner 
2008,  43), do we not confront again the dilemma that bedeviled the realists: “how could 
the idea of the subjectivity of judicial decision be squared with the doctrine that free men 
should be subject only to known and established law” (Purcell, 1973, 94)? 
 
Professor Kim posits that judicial discretion exists in part because “social needs 
demand some measure of flexibility in the application of legal rules” (2007, 442). She 
thus helps us to understand that “judicial politics” are a complement to “law” not only as 
the necessary price, in a human construct, of filling interstices and resolving 
indeterminacies. “Judicial politics” are also a complement to “law,” because “law” needs 
their mediating influence (Scheppele 2002). It is equally true, however, that for reasons 
that span the legal landscape – from the predictability and even-handedness that a well-
functioning market economy requires, to the respect for other lawmaking institutions that 
constitutional democracy requires – “judicial politics” need the restraining influence of 
“law.” In other words, known and established (but not necessarily determinate) law and 
the pursuit of a judge’s preferences on matters of policy relevant in litigation are 
complements in the sense that, like judicial independence and accountability, they need  
(or at least must rely on) each other.  To acknowledge that normative views about the 
proper balance between them as to any particular judge or court (see the first proposition 
above) may differ or that, even on the same normative view and as to the same judge or 
court, the proper balance may change over time, is not to deny that, on some courts and in 
some cases, (1) “law” without “judicial politics” would be weak and feeble, or (2) 
“judicial politics” without “law” would be dangerous.40 Moreover, it is not to deny that 
the two in combination can constitute law in the colloquial sense. 
 
Judge Posner argues that  
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the reasons for the legislative character of much American  
judging lie so deep in our political and legal systems and our  
culture that no feasible reforms could alter it, and furthermore  
that the character of our legal system is not such a terrible thing.  
The falsest of false dawns is the belief that our system can be  
placed on the path to reform by a judicial commitment to  
legalism – to conceiving the judicial role as exhausted in applying  
rules laid down by statutes and constitutions or in using analytic  
methods that enable judges to confine their attention to orthodox  
legal materials and have no truck with policy (2008, 15).41  
 
 
One useful perspective on the historical influences to which he alludes is provided by the 
history of equity.  That American lawyers, scholars and judges in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries could with straight faces have denied the role of judicial agency in (or 
as opposed to) law is, from a historical perspective, hardly surprising. Apart from the 
advantages of such a position as a means to establish, preserve or augment professional 
power, the common law looked relatively determinate and quite free of “judicial politics”  
when compared with the system of equity with which it had long been in competition and 
remnants of which survived the Revolution, reshaped in its image. As described by 
Professor Subrin:  
 
By the sixteenth century, the development of common law 
 jurisprudence thus reflected a very different legal consciousness 
 from equity. Common law was the more confining, rigid, and 
 predictable system; equity was more flexible, discretionary, and 
 individualized. Just as the common law procedural rules and the 
 growth of common law rights were related, so too were the wide- 
 open equity procedures related to the scope of the Chancellor’s 
 discretion and his ability to create new legal principles. In equity, 
 the Chancellor was required to look at more parties, issues, 
 documents, and potential remedies, but he was less bound by 
 precedent and was permitted to determine both questions of facts  
 and law. The equity approach distinctly differed from the writ- 
 dominated system. Judges were given more power by being 
 released from confinement to a single writ, a single form of action, 
and a single issue, …[they were not] as bound by precedent; and they did 
not share power with lay juries (1987, 920).  
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Much changed in the relationship, both in England and in the United States. In England, 
common law and equity were separate systems (of substantive rules, procedures, courts 
and judges). 
 
In the 1600s there were titanic struggles with the common law 
  and Parliament. The spirit of their attack on equity and the Crown  
  can be partly sensed in the sneer of lawyer and historian John Selden 
  around 1650 that “Equity is a Roguish thing: for Law we have 
  a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the Conscience 
  of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is 
  Equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the 
  measure we call a Foot, a Chancellor’s Foot; what an uncertain  
  Measure would be this.” … 
Chancery prevailed in these struggles. But to do so, it surrendered 
  its rationale of exercising the royal prerogative. And it recognized 
  an obligation to treat like cases alike. It was no longer the king’s 
delegate extraordinarily dispensing justice case-by-case, but a 
  regular court of constant resort separately applying its general 
  principles called maxims and even applying rules that it largely 
  adopted from the common law. As a consequence, Chancery 
  received a flood of cases. A reporting system started to embody 
  the output. Equity no longer simply “did equity,” but instead 
  acted only within its fixed jurisdictional bounds. Equity was even 
following stare decisis by 1700 (Field, Kaplan & Clermont 2007, 1072).  
 
 
The price of equity’s survival thus involved becoming more like the common law. Still, 
in part because it reposed so much power in judges (unchecked by juries), equity had a 
chilly reception in some colonies and states of the new United States.  
 
The merger of common law and equity was one of the hallmarks of state 
procedural reform in the nineteenth century, and it was one of the major accomplishments 
of the federal Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Burbank 1982a). As Professor Subrin (1987) has demonstrated, the federal merger gave 
us procedure influenced much more by equity than by common law.42 More important for 
present purposes, however, is Subrin’s description of the relationship between common 
law and equity. Following Maitland’s insight that equity presupposed the existence of 
common law, Subrin observed: 
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In assessing the place of equity practice in the overall legal 
 system, it is critical to realize the extent to which the common law  
system operated as a brake. One could not turn to equity if there 
was an adequate remedy at law. Equity grew interstitially, to fill 
in the gaps of substantive common law (such as the absence of law 
relating to trusts) and to provide a broader array of remedies – 
specific performance, injunctions, and accounting. Equity thus 
provided a “gloss” or “appendix” to the more structured common law.  
An expansive equity practice developed as a necessary companion 
 to common law (1987, 920). 
 
This is one way, as a normative matter, to think about the relationship between “law” and 
“judicial politics.” Or at least it is once one recalls that equity was and is a species of law 
as we colloquially define it. Again, the balance between them will vary within a judicial 
system and across the litigation landscape, and it will vary over time.  
 
It is often said that “we are all legal realists now” (Kalman 1986, 229). Certainly, 
very few if any lawyers believe today that a constitutional case can be decided in the 
mechanistic way that Justice Owen Roberts described.43 Yet, it is probably true that the 
lawyers of every generation need to relearn the lessons of legal realism. One such lesson 
is that, even when a legal provision does not invite the infusion of judicial policy 
preferences, it may be sufficiently indeterminate that judges so inclined can deploy their 
power to try to implement their personal policy preferences. Another lesson is that 
undisciplined pursuit of judicial policy preferences is difficult to square with the 
assumptions of a system that aspires to democracy under law.44  
 
As this discussion suggests, however, the lessons of legal realism are misleading 
to the extent they imply a dichotomy between “law” and “judicial politics.” The critical 
concept is that of discipline, and it operates in both directions.  
 
In one direction, cynicism engendered by a monolithic (and dichotomous) 
conception of both law and politics makes it too easy to ignore the extent to which “law” 
must rely on “judicial politics” in order to avoid (1) crippling formalism (because the 
gaps and indeterminacies, planned and unplanned, that result from avoiding it will be 
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filled by human beings who have policy preferences), and (2) socially destabilizing 
unfairness (because, as Hamilton observed, independent judges are needed to provide 
relief from, by mitigating the severity and confining the operation of, “unjust and partial 
laws”) (Hamilton 1961; Burbank 1999).  Recall that Judge Posner describes “the 
legislative character of much American judging” as “not such a terrible thing” (2008, 
15).45  Professor Ramseyer goes further. In his view, “[t]hat [judges] act politically in 
political cases simply reflects their essential independence. That politics matters should 
not embarrass. To the extent judicial independence is a good, it should engender pride” 
(2008, 3). If this does not assume a dual dichotomy, it invites attention to the constraining 
influence, promoting accountability, of “law.” 
 
In the other direction, I find persuasive Kritzer and Richards’ argument that “the 
justices create jurisprudential regimes to provide guidance to other political actors 
[including other courts] and to themselves,” and that “the goal here is consistency” (2005, 
35). Moreover, a legal system disciplines “judicial politics” not only when it provides 
guidance through law that is determinate, but also by means of practices, norms, and 
customs that have accreted around the judicial office,46 of which adherence to precedent 
is the most important. Such practices, norms and customs can themselves be regarded as 
instantiations of a penchant for self-discipline (Ferejohn & Kramer 2006) that 
acknowledges the sources of, and constraints on, institutional power in a system of 
separate but interdependent lawmaking institutions (Cross 2007; McCloskey 2005). In 
this too, the relationship between “law” and “judicial politics” is akin to the relationship 
between judicial independence and judicial accountability (Geyh, 2006; Burbank & 
Friedman 2002b). 
 
C. Institutional Design 
 
The third lesson I take from a review of the judicial behavior literatures is that, as 
with judicial independence and judicial accountability, the quantum and quality, or mix, 
of “law” and” judicial politics” depends,  or should depend,  on what a particular polity 
wants from its courts. 
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This proposition can be viewed as a normative corollary to, or partial restatement 
of, the proposition that it is an error to think that the relationship between “judicial 
politics” and “law” is or should be the same with respect to every judge (court) in a 
particular judicial system, or that, even with respect to judges on the same court, it is or 
should be the same in every type of case. It echoes Professor Schauer’s suggestion that 
formalism (or what Judge Posner calls “legalism”) “ought to be seen as a tool to be used 
in some parts of the legal system and not in others” (1988, 547), as it does, conversely, 
Professor Kim’s argument that judicial discretion exists in part “because institutional 
values argue for allocating different types of power between different levels of the 
judiciary” (2007, 442). 
 
As Alan Wolfe has observed, the “Social Sciences are not just empirical; they are 
normative, too. … [D]emocratic debate is not well served by pretending that the 
empirical findings of a single controversial approach in a single academic discipline 
contain definitive answers to [normative] questions” (2008, 50). The fact that quantitative 
judicial behavior scholarship, standing alone, cannot answer such questions of 
institutional design is, of course, no reproach. Properly conceived and properly 
implemented, such research could be of enormous benefit to those responsible for 
institutional design who are interested, or can be persuaded to take an interest, in 
knowing what judges in fact do and why they do it. In order to be “properly conceived” 
for these purposes, the research will have to reflect attention to Professor Friedman’s 
concern that quantitative scholarship too often has lacked “normative bite” (2006, 262), a 
concern recently echoed in Wolfe’s observation that “[t]echnique comes first in the new 
[behavioral] economics, just as it did in the old, and conclusions follow” (2008, 53).  It 
may also be true that, before research of this type and with this potential is undertaken, 
those capable of conducting it will have to broaden their (research) horizons to include 
questions of “[p]ower and authority” (Whittington 2000, 631) that they have hitherto 
neglected. 
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On the assumption that future quantitative research will be designed to address 
institutional questions of import, the failure or inability of some theories or models of 
judicial behavior to acknowledge or accommodate the documented phenomenon of 
preference change (or “drift”) (Epstein, Martin, Quinn & Segal 2007; Ruger 2005; 
Burbank 2007a) will limit their ability to inform wise public policy even if their other 
assumptions and methodologies are accepted. Of greater concern, the apparent reluctance 
of some quantitative scholars to embrace and move on from evidence that judicial 
behavior is not monolithic, even on the same court, and even if that court is the United 
States Supreme Court, is antithetical to the development of wise public policy. 
 
At least until recently, quantitative research on judicial behavior by political 
scientists was not likely to come to the attention of those responsible for the development 
and implementation of public policy affecting the judiciary. That may also be true even 
of the non-quantitative work of political scientists whose primary scholarly interest in 
courts relates to institutional dynamics. Meanwhile, the work of those in academia most 
likely to be consulted – law professors – has too often been relentlessly normative or 
woodenly quantitative, eschewing relevant insights of both history and (other) qualitative  
social science (Burbank 2006). Perhaps even more distressing has been the latter day 
promotion by law professors of “scholarship in the aid of reform” (Burbank 1982a, 
1186), this time with the bells, whistles, and apparent invulnerability of statistics 
(Schkade & Sunstein 2003; see Sisk & Heise 2005).  
 
There are many examples of reforms of the judiciary that have not turned out the 
way those responsible for them intended or have turned out in ways they could never 
have imagined. Thus, although we may assume that Congress created the federal courts 
of appeals in 1891 in order to lessen the docket burden of the Supreme Court, it is not 
clear that the legislation would have passed but for the perception that district courts 
(judges) lacked adequate legal accountability (Geyh 2006). As a result of a number of 
other alterations in the relevant landscape, however, district courts have been re-
empowered (Yeazell 1994). 
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 The Congress that in 1925 acceded to the Justices’ request to make the Court’s 
docket almost entirely discretionary surely did not imagine the effects of that legislation   
As recounted by Professor Hartnett (2000), their putative surprise could be explained in 
part by the failure of subsequent Courts to keep almost all of the promises that the 
Justices made to Congress when seeking the legislation. More consequential by far, 
Hartnett suggests (following a number of political scientists (Provine 1980; Pacelle, 
1991)), has been the doctrinal freedom that release from the obligation to police its 
consequences has afforded, coupled with the power that the Court seized by unilaterally 
“claim[ing] the authority to issue limited grants of certiorari, that is, to decide only a 
particular issue in a case, ignoring the other issues” (2000, 1705). As to the former, 
Hartnett asks: 
  
But would the Supreme Court have incorporated the Fourth, Fifth, 
 Sixth, and Eighth Amendments if it were obligated to review every 
 state judgment that upheld a criminal conviction or sentence over 
 a defendant’s objection based on one of these Amendments? And if 
 it did, is it remotely possible that it would have spun out such elaborate 
 doctrinal requirements if it were required to apply and enforce them 
 in every such case (2000, 1732)? 
 
It is not clear which, if any, of the institutional design decisions, by Congress or  
the judiciary, that these examples reflect would have been changed if those making them 
had available relevant quantitative and qualitative political science research (of the 
sophistication and quality that can be expected today) and/or legal scholarship informed 
by the fruits of such research. One can, however, profit from interdisciplinary work of the 
sort that Hartnett’s article represents when comparable questions of institutional design 
are presented in the future. Thus, for instance, both quantitative and qualitative 
scholarship and institutional design decisions about the federal courts of appeals should 
reflect the fact that, just as the Supreme Court “became essentially impervious to 
caseload pressures” after 1925, 
  
so, we now know, are the courts of appeals, at least so long 
 as they have an adequate supply of judicial surrogates with 
 whose help they can create functionally discretionary dockets 
 through tiered decisionmaking, leaving Article III judges freer 
 to search for lawmaking opportunities. In both cases, the 
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 ability of the courts to set their own agenda permits them “to 
 ‘shed  the long-standing image of a neutral arbiter and an  
 interpreter of policy’ and emerge ‘as an active participant in 
 making policy’” (Burbank 2005, 23). 
 
One is not left entirely to speculation, however, about the possible impact of such 
scholarship on the assessment of current proposals affecting the institutional design of the 
judiciary. In order to reach an informed judgment about the claims made by those 
promoting a non-renewable eighteen-year term for Supreme Court Justices (Cramton & 
Carrington 2006), recourse to history and to both quantitative and qualitative research in 
political science is essential. The relevant research concerns not just the Court itself, but 
what the public knows about the Court and how (as bearing on legitimacy), and the 
behavior of interest groups (Burbank 2006).   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
We have made great progress in the study of judicial behaviors, and law 
professors interested in that subject owe a large debt to scholars in political science. Their 
work, quantitative and qualitative, has enriched our knowledge and provided us with new 
tools and perspectives. In devoting attention to the more extreme claims of some 
quantitative political scientists, I do not mean to diminish either their contributions to this 
body of knowledge or the potential that their work holds to enable additional advances. 
Just as it is a mistake to banish law and other influences from the behavioral landscape, 
even at the Supreme Court of the United States, so is it a mistake to neglect the numerous 
insights that the attitudinalists and other like-minded (as to judicial preferences) scholars 
have provided, and continue to provide, that shed light on an extraordinarily complex 
subject.   
 
I have argued that the record to date counsels humility about our capacity 
definitively to pin down the causal mechanisms of judicial behaviors and that, for this 
and other reasons, it also counsels embrace of methodological pluralism. These are not, 
however, the only reasons for scholars to abandon their intra- and inter-disciplinary turf 
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wars, to resolve to help, and learn from, each other, and to pay close attention to the ways 
in which they present their findings and state their claims. 
 
Three years ago, I described the state of interbranch relations affecting the 
judiciary as follows:  
 
   Recent years have witnessed attacks on the courts, federal  
and state, that have been notable for both their frequency and  
their stridency. Many of these attacks have been part of strategies 
calculated to create and sustain an impression of judges that  
makes courts fodder for electoral politics. The strategies reflect  
a theory of judicial agency, the idea that judges are a means to  
an end and that it is appropriate to pursue chosen ends through the 
selection of judges who are committed or will commit in advance to 
pursue those ends on the bench. The impression sought to be  
created is that not only are courts part of the political system;  
they and the judges who make them up are part of ordinary politics.  
 
At the federal level, pursuit of these strategies prompts politicians  
to curry favor by promising to hold courts accountable: staffing  
them (or ensuring that they are staffed) with reliable judges,  
monitoring them through “oversight,” and, when they stray, reining  
them in through the instruments of politics, ordinary or extraordinary 
(impeachment). At both the federal and state levels, these strategies  
enable interest groups to wield influence by framing judicial  
selection in terms of the supposed causal influence of a vote in  
favor of or against a judicial nominee or candidate on results in  
high salience cases such as those involving the death penalty  
or abortion.  
…. 
Given what we know about public knowledge of and attitudes  
towards courts and about the incentives and tactics of the interest  
groups that are involved in judicial selection, there is reason to  
fear that the distinction between support for courts irrespective  
of the decisions they make (“diffuse support”) and support depending  
on those decisions ( “specific support”) will disappear. If that  
were to occur, the people would ask of the judiciary only “what  
have you done for me lately?,” and, at least in systems where they  
lacked the ability to express their preferences directly (i.e., by  
voting in an election or retention election), would expect elected  
officials to help them secure the desired results by holding courts and 
judges “accountable” when they failed to produce them. Politicians  
whose strategies had encouraged viewing judges as policy agents  
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would have no incentive to resist. Those inclined to resist in the  
public interest might find it very difficult to do so. 
 
In such a system, law itself would be seen as nothing  
more than ordinary politics, and it would become increasingly  
difficult to appoint (elect, or retain) people with the qualities  
necessary for judicial independence, because the actors involved  
would be preoccupied with a degraded notion of judicial  
accountability.  At the end of the day, judicial independence  
would become a junior partner to judicial accountability,  
or the partnership would be dissolved (Burbank 2007b, 910, 916). 
 
It may be that these risks have diminished at the federal level with the loss of 
power of those primarily responsible for the strategies I identified and the attacks on 
courts that were designed to implement them. Even if so, however, recrudescence is 
possible, and, in any event, the federal courts are responsible for only a very small 
portion of the judicial business in this country. It thus remains important that scholars not 
contribute to the process of assimilating the law made by judges to ordinary politics 
unless they are confident, and have adequate reason to be confident, about their findings 
and the inferences they draw from them (Sisk & Heise 2005)..  
 
Professor Gillman has cautioned  judicial behavior scholars to consider “the 
potential real world consequences of this debate [between thinking of law as behavioral 
uniformity and thinking of it as good faith deliberation], especially as it moves beyond 
the insulated borders of political science,” and “to be especially careful of what we mean 
by legal and political decision making” (2001, 497). Judge Posner has observed that the 
“attitudinalists’ traditional preoccupation with politically charged cases decided by the 
Supreme Court creates an exaggerated impression of the permeation of American judging 
by politics” since “[m]ost cases decided by American courts are neither politically 
charged nor decided in the Supreme Court” (2008, 27-28). He has also pointed out that 
the trend toward selecting “judges who will be politically dependable … is the triumph of 
the attitudinal school” (2008, 169). 
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This is not a plea that “’valid social research should not be undertaken in order to 
protect cherished myths’” (Segal & Spaeth 2002, 429).  There is a difference between the 
merit of a research topic and of a model used to explore it, as there is between the merit 
of a model and the methods by which, and the data with which, it is tested. In any event, 
one need not be a mythologist to believe that, the more obvious the real world 
implications of research, the more important it is that researchers attend carefully not just 
to their models, methodology and data, but also to their findings and the claims that those 
findings reasonably support.  The ability of policymakers who are so inclined not to “see 
but narrowly” (Freund, 1956, 802) when considering institutional design (and other) 
questions affecting the judiciary depends critically on the willingness and ability of 
scholars to abjure methodological imperialism and to recognize the value of pluralism in 
perspective as well as methodology. 
 
[I]t is possible to understand us [human beings] – slowly,  
patiently, in fits and starts, and with due respect for those  
who have been studying us for so long … In both the social  
scientific and humanistic studies of human existence, it is  
not revolutions that we need. What we need are observations  
and suggestions and ideas, collected one at a time, by different  
people, from different disciplines, with different methodologies.  
That is not sexy, but neither is it easy (Wolfe 2008, 55). 
 
 
 
 
.  
 
                                                 
1  Nine years previously I had observed that Judge Weinstein’s professed indifference to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might be shared by “federal judges who do not share 
his politics,” leading to the concern that “as judges of Jack Weinstein’s sympathies are 
replaced by those whose interests lie elsewhere, ‘the personality of our legal system’ he 
describes will … seem as remote as the history of the Rules Enabling Act” (Burbank 
1988, 33).  
 
 
2  The phenomenon is not restricted to attitudinalists. Professor Whittington notes that 
“rational choice models have no mechanism for dealing with ambiguity. As a result, 
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scholars in this tradition have tended to produce highly stylized models of judicial 
behavior with unclear relevance to actual decision making” (2000, 627). 
3 I continued: “That is not only because judges are human. It results as well from the fact 
that in our system ‘the line between law and policy … is blurred [because] [m]any cases 
cannot be decided by reasoning from conventional legal materials [and] [s]uch cases 
require the judge to exercise a legislative judgment’” (Burbank 1997, 1999).  
4  So, apparently, do political scientists. Segal and Spaeth’s description of the law of 
preclusion is a disaster (2002, 236-37). 
5  “Without such knowledge or perspective, we may be prisoners of the unarticulated 
agendas, conscious or unconscious, of those responsible for making and administering 
the rules, and of those with the power to bring about change in their content” (Burbank 
2002a, 343).  The “knowledge or perspective” needed, I argued was that “necessary to 
get behind the words of a case or rule and to evaluate by some method more scientific 
than navel-gazing (which is how I would uncharitably characterize many discussions of 
‘policy’ in procedure or other fields) and more socially productive than ideology (which 
is how I would uncharitably characterize many works of critical legal scholarship) the 
fruits of technical reasoning, however acute” (Burbank 2002a, 343). 
6  Robert Hutchins, who adopted a realist approach while a professor at Yale Law School, 
rejected its tenets after he became President of the University of Chicago. As described 
by Purcell, Hutchins came to believe that “the search for facts to discover how the law 
operated had failed in its purpose, for without some basic ideas of the true nature of law, 
legal researchers did not know what facts to look for nor what to do with them once they 
found them. The resulting research ‘did not help us to understand the law, the social 
order, or the relation between the two.’ The whole concept of the ‘fact situation,’ 
Hutchins concluded, threatened the legal profession ‘with a reductio ad absurdum.’” 
Hutchins also came to believe that his colleagues “had been forced to surreptitiously 
bring in their own personal value judgments in order to make the pragmatic criteria 
viable” (1973, 146).  
7  “Introduced originally into American legal education in 1871 by Christopher C. 
Langdell, the dean of Harvard Law School, the case method rested on the assumption that 
a close study of past judicial decisions would reveal the basic principles and rules of the 
law that had led to the various decisions” (Purcell 1973, 75). 
8  “But saluting these content-free, technocratic-seeming precepts is to adjudicating as 
spring training is to the baseball season. The precepts are warm-up measures. Closure 
requires agreement on substance. Without that, the choice of neutral principles is up in 
the air. No more than legal realism could legal process offer a substitute for legalism on 
the one hand and politics and emotion on the other” (Posner 2008, 236). 
9  Whether one deems empirical work by scholars of law and society (Mather 2008) an 
exception to this proposition may depend on one’s views about “elite law schools.” 
10  It is true that procedural rules are never neutral in their effects, if not 
 their purposes. It is also likely that there has been more systematic 
 misrepresentation about the value-free nature of procedural rules than 
 about any other category in the traditional lexicon. But what does it mean 
 to say that procedural choices are “political”? To some it may mean either 
 that procedural choices are driven by an individual’s own substantive 
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 values or that they should be. One holding that view may be suspicious of 
 the purposes of every judge or law reformer who has a choice in the  
 application or formulation of doctrine. There is, however, a difference 
 between purposes and effects. Neither judges nor procedural reformers 
 have a general charter to reform society, and broad-scale social reform would 
 be necessary to eradicate the non-neutral effects of many, and perhaps most, 
 procedural rules. 
 
 If procedural rules are not neutral and judges and reformers should not 
 use procedural rules to advance their own substantive values, we confront 
 a paradox: neutral transmission of the substantive law, if possible, would itself 
be a political act because it would reinforce the status quo. The paradox 
disappears to the extent that one can distinguish individuals’ values from the 
values that inform the rules of substantive law. The reminder that there is no 
bright line between procedure and substantive law has been a refuge of procedural 
 reformers for fifty years. But the existence of “under-determinacy” is no 
 reason to wipe the slate clean (Burbank 1987, 1472-73). 
11  It cannot have helped that the “whistleblowing” rhetoric of some of those writing in 
law reviews whose work inspired a renaissance of the rational choice model in political 
science not only dismissed law but left no room even for motivated reasoning (Cross & 
Tiller 1998; Kim 2009). 
12 Professor Spaeth has recently reiterated his insistence that Pritchett’s “assertion that 
judging is different from the free choice of congresspersons or administrators is simply 
false” (Spaeth 2008, 753). 
 
 
13  Professor Spaeth’s recent description of “a vehement antibehavioral onslaught” (2008,  
757) is a useful reminder that the intolerance within political science has run in both 
directions. Gillman refers to a “symmetry of frustration” (2001, 484). “Almost fifty years 
after these seminal accounts were published, the degree to which contemporary political 
scientists acknowledge the possibility of legal influence on judicial behavior appears to 
correlate with the degree to which they use interpretive methods” (Keck 2007, 515). 
14  “Like Newton, academics stand on the shoulders of giants – but they stand on them to 
bury them” (Wolfe 2008, 55). 
15  Compare Professor Hilbink’s review of the sections of the Oxford Handbook of Law 
and Politics dealing with comparative and international/supranational perspectives: 
 In striving to establish our legitimacy as comparatavists interloping 
 in a traditionally Americanist domain, however, I fear we are, perhaps 
 unwittingly, reproducing some of the existing pathologies of the law 
 and courts subfield. … I was struck by three things: first, the almost 
 exclusive focus on high courts and constitutional decision-making in 
 the countries of study; second, a tendency to discount the relevance of 
 factors in any way internal to law or legal institutions; and third, a limited 
 and limiting view of politics as narrowly instrumental (Hilbink 2008, 1098). 
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16  The empirical legal studies (ELS) movement is broader than portrayed by Keck, who 
described it “as the new law school equivalent of what political scientists usually call 
‘judicial behavior’ research” (2007, 512). Moreover, the account in the text does not 
include either economists or psychologists who do empirical work and who have been 
hired by law schools in increasing numbers. 
17  See supra note 6. “Legal pragmatism is disciplined by a structure of norms and 
doctrine, commonly expressed in standards such as negligence, good faith, and freedom 
of speech, that tells judges what consequences  they can consider and how (in what 
relation to each other, for example). Take away the framework and what judges do does 
not merit the word ‘law’” (Posner 2008, 362). 
18  Dialogue about judicial behavior among legal scholars and qualitative political 
scientists is well-established (Keck 2007). 
19  Those aware that law reviews are not peer-reviewed may ask “What is second prize?” 
As the earlier reference to the debate (and ultimately dialogue) between scholars teaching 
in law schools and judges suggests, the benefit is the greater opportunity that publication 
in law reviews affords actually to reach and affect those being studied (and others with 
whom judges interact). 
20  “That the justices use their attitudes to decide cases still does not tell us why they 
might do so … Indeed, theory is probably Spaeth’s weakest area” (Benesh 2003, 125). 
21  “Epstein and Knight [1998] reject this possibility [that adherence to norms stems from 
the justices “professional (and perhaps ideological) commitment to the substantive 
content of those norms”], and it is not entirely clear why, although one suspects that it has 
to do with their assumption that policymaking is the primary objective of the 
justices….But one result of this assumption is that, at times, some of the explanations of 
the book feel a bit forced” (Bloom 2001, 223). 
22 As discussed below, those willing to indulge the possibility of truth without formal 
statistical proof, have other reasons to doubt that the only “attitudes” driving the behavior 
of judges, including Supreme Court Justices, are their attitudes as to policy (Baum 2006; 
Kim 2007; Posner 2008). 
 
 
23  Segal and Spaeth assert that “[w]hen prior preferences and precedents are the same , it 
is not meaningful to speak of decisions being determined by precedent” (2002, 290). The 
obverse is equally true. “In this formulation, what is important is not whether the justices 
are acting on the basis of law or politics; that question is likely to be difficult to answer 
other than by fiat – naming certain commitments ‘legal’ and other ‘political’” (Keck 
2007, 550). Compare Segal (1984) with Segal & Spaeth (2002).  
 
24  “Variables may also not bear the meaning attributed to them because of coding 
conventions or coding errors. Readers of empirical work should always look behind the 
language in which results are presented for information about how a concept has been 
operationalized, which is to say instantiated in the data” (Lempert 2009, 244).  
25  Methodological humility seems appropriate for the anterior reason that, once one 
recognizes that most judges, most of the time, seek to advance a variety of preferences, 
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one confronts the fact that “it is difficult to test formal models when multiple goals are 
being pursued” (Brenner 2003, 280).  
26  Compare Professor Kritzer’s description of Martin Shapiro’s anticipation of “what we 
today call the new institutionalism” (2003, 387): 
 The thrust of Shapiro’s analysis is that the Supreme Court’s role 
 in the policy process varies substantially from area to area. The 
 variations depend on factors such as the need for technical expertise, 
 the level of detail involved in the area, the constitutional or statutory 
 nature of the issues, and the nature of the policy implementation 
 process (2003, 390). 
For the view that “[e]mpirical and normative studies of circuit courts must take into 
account their unique historical, geographic and legal characteristics,” see George & 
Yoon, 2008, 50.   
27  Similarly, Paul Frymer has recently written that “[w]ere Law and APD [American 
Political Development ] scholars to examine courts more broadly as institutions, they 
would see the multitude of roles judges (Supreme Court, federal, state, and 
administrative), lawyers, appellants, and institutional procedures and rules play in both 
the development and current functioning of modern government” (2008, 782). 
28  “Focusing on non-unanimous cases or on controversial issue areas, as some of 
Spaeth’s work does, misses these easy cases, thereby underestimating the strength of the 
legal model” (Benesh 2003, 124). Compare in that regard the explanation given for the 
view that the Court’s control over its docket “is a requisite for” the Justices voting their 
policy preferences: “Many meritless cases undoubtedly exist that no self-respecting judge 
would decide solely on the basis of his or her policy preferences” (Segal & Spaeth 2002,  
93). Professor Spaeth has recently sought to explain unanimous decisions as caused by 
“indifference.” Thus, “[a]t the Supreme Court level, decisions of limited applicability, 
such as those involving narrow tax questions, matters of arcane civil procedure, or the 
preemptive effect of federal legislation (sic), may also engender indifference” (2008,  
762).  
29  Professor David Shapiro has provided a good recent summary of the empirical 
literature on the role of precedent on the Supreme Court (2008, 938-40).  
30  Two things fatally undermined legal realism in the eyes of the professional 
 legal community and later killed off critical legal studies, legal realism’s 
 radical grandchild. The first was that the realists exaggerated the open 
 area, sometimes implying that all cases are indeterminate. The second was 
 that the noisier realists imputed willfulness, whether in the form of politics 
 or prejudice or sheer orneriness, to judges” (Posner 2008, 112). 
31  “How could a judge think himself a good judge if he thought his decisions seasoned 
with politics or personality? One answer is that he might be sophisticated enough to 
realize that this just is the nature of American judging. But a more interesting answer is 
that the nonlegalist influences on a judge are likely to operate subliminally” (Posner 
2008, 65). 
32  Jack Knight and Lee Epstein note that stare decisis serves as an important 
 norm constraining Justices from being “motivated by their own preferences” 
 because, inter alia, attorneys rely primarily on precedents, the Justices invoke 
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 them at conference and in their opinions, and cases overruled amount to only 
 a miniscule percentage of those available for overruling. At the very least, then, 
 precedent shapes strategic behavior by advocates and judges – even those who 
 may put little stock in the doctrine. Presumably they do so not because they are 
 all engaged in a collective effort of self-deception but because some significant 
 percentage of those who decide do consider precedent an important factor in 
 reaching a result (Shapiro 2008, 939-40). 
33  Strategic models typically neglect the fact that “law, like other institutions, is created  
by actors (justices) with political goals (attitudes) whose subsequent decisions are then in 
turn influenced but not determined by the institutional structure they have created” 
(Kritzer & Richards 2005, 35). 
34  “Absent the ability to peer inside a judge’s mind and observe a thing called ‘ideology’ 
at work, the only way to measure ‘ideology’ is to focus upon some observable trait or 
behavior that is correlated with, or indicative of, ideology” (Fischman & Law 2008, 8-9).  
35  Compare Alan Wolfe’s conclusions about behavioral economics (or economic 
psychology). Having observed that neoclassical economics “remains a vulnerable 
approach, stuck in unrealistic assumptions about human behavior” (2008, 54), he states 
that “[w]hat began as a movement marked by a curious, if not actually humanistic, 
sensibility has transformed itself into a one-dimensional vision of human nature in which 
the perfect rationality of neoclassical economics is replaced by an equally simple-minded 
conception of human beings as either happiness maximizers or perfect fools” (2008, 55). 
36  Observe that, in the absence of a stipulated definition of “judicial politics,” one might 
as well say that the answer depends on how one defines “politics.”  
 But I remind the reader that partisan politics is not the only politics, 
 and politics shades into ideology, which in turn shades into common  
 sense, moral insights, notions of sound policy, and other common and 
 ineradicable elements of judicial decision making. Politics in these 
 extended senses is the core of the attitudinal model, sensibly construed… . 
 (Posner 2008, 73). 
37 “The amount of legislating that a judge does depends on the breadth of his ‘zone of 
reasonableness’ – the area within which he has discretion to decide a case either way 
without disgracing himself. The zone varies from judiciary to judiciary and from judge to 
judge. Among institutional factors that influence the breadth of the zone is the judge’s 
rank in the judicial hierarchy” (Posner 2008, 86). 
38  Attitudinalists and legalists disagree about the extent of political judging 
 rather than about its existence. One source of that disagreement is that 
 attitudinalists, who mostly are political scientists rather than lawyers, 
 are positive theorists, while most legalists are lawyers, who – inveterately 
 normative as most lawyers are – very much want, and are predisposed 
 by their training and by the mores and understandings of the profession 
 to expect, judges to conform to the legalist conception … In contrast, 
 since the subject of political science is politics, political scientists expect 
 judging to be imbued with politics – and even want it to be, as demonstrating 
 the power of political science to illuminate behavior (Posner 2008, 47). 
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39  Courts, not judges, have judicial power, at least in the federal court system. This 
suggests that the atomistic assumptions of attitudinalism and many rational choice 
models are also discordant with basic assumptions of the founding. 
40  “An accountable judiciary without any independence is weak and feeble. An 
independent judiciary without any accountability is dangerous” (Burbank 2003, 325). 
41  Results of a laboratory experiment suggest that “given a particular policy preference, 
judgments about a law’s constitutionality depend, in part, on the law’s policy 
implications” (Furgeson, Babcock & Shane 2008, 225).. 
42  This (coupled with the recognition of the power of procedure) helps to explain why, 
more than sixty years after the merger, and in a case involving the provisional remedies 
available in an action for breach of contract, the opportunity to minimize the powers of a 
court of equity appealed to Justice Scalia, who had bigger fish to fry (Burbank 2002b). 
43  “When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming 
to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,-- 
to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is 
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former” (United States v. 
Butler, 62). 
44  Another, made by Purcell (1973) and again thirty-five years later by Judge Posner 
(2008), is that neither in scholarship nor in judging can pragmatism be a value-neutral 
enterprise. 
45  Compare the legal realist, Max Radin’s view: 
 But in that great mass of transactions which will not fit readily or quickly 
  into established types, or will fit into one just as easily as another, the 
 judge ought to be a free agent. We need not fear arbitrariness. Our Cokes 
 and Mansfields and Eldons derive their physical and spiritual nourishment 
 from the same sources that we do. They will find good what we find good,  
 if we will let them (1993, 198).  
46  “The ‘constraining rules’ operating on judicial actors may not be directly legible off 
the legal text. Indeed, there may be formal rules and informal norms internal and 
particular to judicial institutions that shape and constrain judicial conduct by providing, 
as historical institutionalists put it, ‘the content of the identities, preferences, and interests 
that actors [can] embrace and express’” (Hilbink 2008, 1099-1100). 
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